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How Would the President’s Fiscal Commission’s Social Security Proposals 
Affect Future Beneficiaries? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using the Dynamic Simulation of Income Model, we project how Social Security benefits 
and payroll taxes would change were Congress to enact the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform’s proposal. We show benefits at several points in time and relative 
to pre-retirement income, a low-income standard, and lifetime payroll tax contributions. The 
proposal’s projected effects are particularly deep relative to current law scheduled for those 
reaching retirement in several decades. Projected benefit reductions relate closely to lifetime 
earnings: Lower earners are largely shielded, higher earners face significant reductions. 
Projections are sensitive to workers’ assumed responses to certain proposal provisions. 
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How Would the President’s Fiscal Commission’s Social Security Proposals 
Affect Future Beneficiaries? 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 In December 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
(NCFRR) released a set of recommendations to help place the Social Security program on a 
sounder long-run financial footing. These recommendations included the following provisions 
that reduce the long-run fiscal imbalance through increased payroll tax contributions or reduced 
benefits: 
 
• Increase the earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax; 
• Modify the benefit formula to slow the growth of future benefits;  
• When calculating the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), replace the current version of 
the consumer price index (CPI), the CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers, or 
CPI-W, with the chained consumer price index (C-CPI-U, also known as the superlative 
CPI); 
• Index the Early Eligibility Age (EEA) and the Full Retirement Age (FRA) to life 
expectancy to maintain a roughly constant ratio of retirement years to work years; and 
• Cover newly hired state and local workers under Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI).  
 
Additional provisions aim to shore up benefit adequacy and, in some cases, mitigate 
effects of the prior provisions.  These adjustments include the following:  
 
• A minimum benefit for full-career low-wage workers; 
• A benefit enhancement for the long-lived and longtime disabled;  
• A hardship exemption from increases in the EEA and FRA for individuals with low 
lifetime earnings and relatively long careers; and 
• An option for beneficiaries subject to increases in EEA and FRA (because the hardship 
exemption does not apply to them) to start receiving up to one-half of the benefit for 
which they would be eligible at age 62. 
 
This report presents distributional estimates of the effects of the commission’s proposal 
on future Social Security beneficiaries. All projections rely on the Urban Institute’s Dynamic 
Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM), a model of the retirement resources of the U.S. 
population based on the 1990–1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). 
 
Our distributional analysis reveals that the projected effects of NCFRR’s proposal are 
particularly deep relative to current law scheduled for those reaching retirement age several 
decades from now, when reductions are phased in. In addition, projected benefit reductions are 
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closely related to lifetime earnings, with those at the bottom of the lifetime earnings 
distribution largely shielded and those at the top experiencing significant reductions.  
 
Figure ESUM-1 displays this pattern by contrasting projected outcomes under the 
proposal as a share of current law scheduled benefits in each year of the simulation for the top, 
bottom, and middle lifetime earnings quintiles. It also compares projected benefits under the 
proposal to two alternatives: a payable baseline under which Social Security is not changed at 
all in the near term and beneficiaries face across-the-board benefit reductions once the trust 
funds are exhausted, and a “feasible” baseline under which action is similarly deferred until 
trust fund exhaustion, but at that point balance is restored though an even division between 
benefit reductions and payroll tax increases. Individuals in the lowest quintile are projected to 
be least affected by the NCFRR proposal—their average projected benefits remain consistently 
above 95 percent of current law scheduled—while those in the middle and highest quintiles see 
considerably larger projected percentage reductions. In later years of the simulation, projected 
benefits for those in the highest quintile are less than those under the payable option, while 
those for the middle quintile begin to fall below feasible benefits. 
 
 
Figure ESUM-1: Average Social Security Benefits as a Percentage of Current Law Scheduled 
under NCFRR’s Proposal, Current Law Payable, and Current Law Feasible by Shared Lifetime 
Earnings Quintile, 2010–2085 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Projections in this figure do not include claiming of the optional half benefit. See full text 
for information on the sensitivity of projections to this assumption. Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the 
combined OASDI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied identically to OASI and DI 
beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits 
are paid).  
 
 
Averages can mask the diversity of projected experiences for beneficiaries within a 
lifetime earnings quintile. Figure ESUM-2 displays this range by contrasting projected 
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outcomes by lifetime earnings quintile for three sets of birth years for younger workers today 
(those born from 1966 to 1970, 1971 to 1975, and 1976 to 1980). The variable we examine here 
is the ratio of lifetime Social Security benefits to payroll tax contributions (relative to current 
law scheduled), so it takes into account changes to both the payroll tax and benefit sides of the 
program the NCFRR proposal incorporates. With each successive generation, reductions in 
projected benefits relative to contributions grow deeper compared to current law scheduled, 
especially for those with higher lifetime earnings, under the NCFRR proposal. For example, 
more than half of the beneficiaries born from 1976 through 1980 who are in the highest lifetime 
earnings quintile are projected to receive reductions of greater than 20 percent in their benefit 
to tax ratios relative to current law. 
 
 
Figure ESUM-2: Projected Change in Ratio of Lifetime Individual Social Security Benefits to 
Contributions under NCFRR’s Proposal Relative to Current Law Scheduled for Individuals 
Born Between 1966 and 1970, 1971 and 1975, and 1976 to 1980 by Shared Lifetime Earnings 
Quintile  
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the cohort, not the overall population. The real 
discount rate for accumulating both contributions and benefits is 2 percent.  
 
Our full report shows a wider range of outcomes—including mean and median benefits, 
replacement rates, and share of beneficaries with income less than 25 percent of the Average 
Wage Index (a measure of wage-indexed poverty status)—for more groups over the full 
simulation horizon (through 2085). Each measure provides additional important information 
about the proposal’s projected effects. We also examine separate provisions of the proposal 
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incrementally to show how the provisions interact. The picture, while more detailed, tends to be 
fairly consistent across measures—the effects of the proposal relative to current law scheduled 
grow markedly over time and across birth years and with lifetime earnings. 
 
Ultimately, how one evaluates outcomes under the commission plan depends on the 
alternatives to which one compares it, coupled with one’s views about the best way to share the 
burden of bringing OASDI into long-run fiscal balance within and between generations.  An 
important aspect of this inter- and intragenerational sharing is the chosen balance between 
increased payroll taxes and benefit reductions. The proposal generally leaves beneficiaries in 
the bottom four lifetime earnings quintiles with higher benefits than they would have under a 
payable baseline. Compared to a “feasible” baseline, relatively fewer beneficiaries have higher 
benefits, but the lower two quintiles still have comparably high benefits. 
 
These analyses of the NCFRR proposal and the payable and feasible counterfactuals 
that describe Social Security benefits when action is deferred until the Trust Fund becomes 
insolvent clearly illustrate the importance of early action on Social Security’s fiscal challanges. 
If Congress waits until the Trust Fund is exhausted, as is assumed under the feasible and 
payable benchmarks, the required adjustments to OASDI benefits and/or payroll taxes would 
need to be considerable. Congress could avert these sorts of adjustments by starting to phase in 
provisions that would improve the program’s long-run financial status over the next two and a 
half decades.  
 
Finally, we present sensitivity analyses that illustrate how important choices about 
measures and behavioral response can be and how uncertain projections into the distant future 
are. We show that integrating the proposed provision to allow claiming of a partial benefit at 
the current law early eligibility age for those not fully covered by the hardship exemption is 
particularly challenging, and that projection results differ significantly at a point in time 
depending on what one assumes about take up of this benefit. While the bottom line story about 
the NCFRR proposal is fairly consistent across the sensitivity analyses and alternative 
measures, it is clear that values for any particular projected outcome can differ markedly 
depending on details of how the measure is calculated or which underlying assumptions 
analysts select. This high degree of sensitivity underscores the importance of focusing on 
relative differences across options, including counterfactuals like payable or feasible benefits, 
using consistent metrics, rather than focusing on any particular percentage or other value to 
summarize a complex set of interacting provisions like those in the NCFRR proposal. 
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How Would the President’s Fiscal Commission’s Social Security Proposals 
Affect Future Beneficiaries?1  
 
Introduction 
 
President Obama established the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
(NCFRR) in 2010 to recommend policy reforms to address the nation’s long-run fiscal 
challenges. The president appointed six members drawn from both major political parties, and 
Democratic and Republican congressional leaders each appointed six elected members—half 
from the House and half from the Senate. Former White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles 
and former Senator Alan Simpson chaired the commission. In November of 2010, these co-
chairs released a detailed advance proposal. The overall commission released its 
recommendations, which closely reflected key components of the co-chairs’ proposal, in 
December 2010.2 Ultimately, only 11 of the commission’s 18 members voted in favor of the 
recommendations in the report—three short of the 14 required votes for the report to be issued 
to Congress. Still, the fact that such politically difficult recommendations received majority 
support was widely reported to be a notable achievement.  
 
One of NCFRR’s key proposals was to improve Social Security’s long-run fiscal status 
through both benefit reductions and tax increases. The reasons for proposing changes to Social 
Security—the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program—are well 
known.3 The program is currently running a 75-year deficit, estimated at about $6.5 trillion, 
equivalent to about 2.2 percent of payroll (OASDI Board of Trustees 2011).4 If no changes are 
made to the program, Social Security will be able to pay only about 77 percent of scheduled 
benefits starting in 2036, the year the trust fund is projected to become insolvent.5  
 
Five commission recommendations focus on improving Social Security’s financial outlook:  
 
• Increase the earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax; 
• Modify the benefit formula to slow the growth of future benefits;  
• When calculating the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), replace the current version of 
the consumer price index (CPI), the CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers, or 
                                                 
1 We thank Richard W. Johnson, C. Eugene Steuerle, and Sheila R. Zedlewski of the Urban Institute; Mark Sarney 
of the Social Security Administration; Julie Topoleski of the Congressional Budget Office; Mikki Waid of AARP; 
Debra Whitman of the Senate Aging Committee; and one additional external reviewer for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. We are also grateful to Douglas Murray and Karen Smith for their tireless work on our model. All 
errors remain our own. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the Urban Institute, its board, or 
sponsors. Please direct correspondence to Melissa Favreault (mfavreault@urban.org). 
2 See Palmer and Penner (2011) for a comparison of the fiscal commission proposals for tackling the deficit with 
those from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Deficit Reduction Task Force.  
3 We use the terms Social Security and OASDI interchangeably throughout this report. 
4 The longer term (or “infinite horizon”) deficit is projected to be about $17.9 trillion, equivalent to about 3.6 
percent of future taxable payroll or 1.2 percent of future gross domestic product (GDP) (OASDI Board of Trustees 
2011). 
5 The Congressional Budget Office (2011) projects a somewhat later insolvency date (2038) for the combined 
OASDI Trust Fund and a somewhat lower actuarial deficit (between 1.58 and 2.00 percent of payroll depending on 
assumptions about future parameters in the income tax system), but the qualitative picture is similar. 
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CPI-W, with the chained consumer price index (C-CPI-U, also known as the superlative 
CPI); 
• Index the Early Eligibility Age (EEA) and the Full Retirement Age (FRA) to life 
expectancy to maintain a roughly constant ratio of retirement years to work years; and 
• Cover newly hired state and local workers under OASDI.  
 
Several additional provisions aim to shore up benefit adequacy, as follows:  
 
• A minimum benefit for full-career low-wage workers; 
• A benefit enhancement for the long-lived and longtime disabled;  
• A hardship exemption from increases in the EEA and FRA for individuals with low 
lifetime earnings; and 
• An option for beneficiaries subject to increases in EEA and FRA to start receiving up to 
one-half of the benefit for which they would be eligible at age 62.6  
 
This report presents distributional estimates of the effects of the commission’s proposal on 
future Social Security beneficiaries. All projections rely on the Urban Institute’s Dynamic 
Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM). After discussing each of the provisions in the 
NCFRR’s proposal in greater detail, we explain our methods and measures and present the 
simulation results. Our distributional analysis reveals that the projected effects of NCFRR’s 
proposal are particularly deep relative to current law scheduled for those reaching retirement 
age several decades from now, when reductions are phased in. In addition, projected benefit 
reductions are closely related to lifetime earnings, with those at the bottom of the lifetime 
earnings distribution largely shielded and those at the top experiencing significant reductions. 
 
 
NCFRR’s Proposal 
 
The fiscal commission proposal includes both increases in revenues and reductions in costs 
over time relative to those currently scheduled. Social Security actuaries estimate that the 
NCFRR proposal would close the program’s 75-year actuarial imbalance (Goss 2010). Benefit 
reductions eliminate more than half of the shortfall, while revenue increases eliminate the 
remainder.7  
 
Gradually increase the taxable earnings cap to cover 90 percent of wages by 2049 
 
                                                 
6 Our core simulations of the impact of the NCFRR Social Security proposal do not include this provision for two 
reasons: 1) the proposal lacked sufficient detail on how this provision is intended to affect auxiliary benefits; and 
2) Social Security’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT) estimates this provision would have only negligible 
effects on both the long-range OASDI actuarial deficit and annual deficits (Goss 2010). We show how this 
exclusion affects our results in sensitivity analyses which represent the half benefit in a simplified way. 
7 Authors’ calculation based on information in table A, Goss (2010). Estimates of individual provisions cannot be 
summed to determine the precise ratio of savings from the benefit and revenue sides because provisions interact.  
The respective roles that revenue increases and benefit reductions play under the NCFRR proposal change 
markedly over time:  in early years, most improvement in actuarial balance is due to increased revenue, while 
benefit reductions dominate the changes in later years. 
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Under current law, most U.S. workers contribute 6.2 percent of earnings to Social Security, up 
to a cap.8 Their employers pay an equal amount. (Self-employed workers pay both halves of the 
payroll tax). The cap was $106,800 in 2011, and it increases each year by the percent change in 
the national average wage.9 In 1982, about 90 percent of earnings in OASDI-covered 
employment were subject to the Social Security payroll tax. This share has decreased markedly 
since then as wages above the cap grew faster than average earnings, falling to about 83 percent 
in 2007 (before the recession hit). The commission proposes to gradually increase this cap (by 
2 percent per year) so that by 2049 it again covers 90 percent of total wages. These newly 
covered earnings do count toward Social Security benefits, though typically at a relatively low 
rate, as described below.10  
 
Benefit formula change 
 
In return for their Social Security contributions, workers (and their dependents) receive benefits 
when they retire, die, or become disabled. Retirement benefits are based on the highest 35 years 
of a worker’s earnings as long as the worker has accumulated at least 40 quarters, or about 10 
years, of covered earnings. When calculating benefits, annual earnings are capped at the taxable 
maximum, indexed to the change in the national average wage, averaged, and divided by 
twelve to arrive at an average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) figure. AIME is converted 
into a primary insurance amount (PIA) so that benefits replace a higher percentage of earnings 
for workers with lower lifetime earnings.11 Specifically, the current-law base Social Security 
benefit is calculated using a progressive three-bracket formula that replaces 90 percent of the 
first $756 (wage-indexed) average monthly lifetime earnings, 32 percent of the next $3,800, 
and 15 percent of the remaining earnings, up to the taxable maximum. The points at which the 
replacement percentages change are referred to as the bend points. Expressed as annual 
amounts, the 2011 bend points are $9,072 and $54,672. The monthly retirement benefit for a 
worker who begins collecting at the FRA equals the PIA.12 
 
NCFRR recommends gradually transitioning from this three-bracket formula to a five-
bracket formula by adding an additional bend point at the taxable maximum in 2013 and 
breaking the middle bracket into two at the median AIME from 2017 forward.13 Additionally, 
the replacement percentages are gradually reduced from 90, 32, and 15 percent to 90, 30, 10, 
and 5 percent in 2050. As a result, this provision on its own leaves those workers with lifetime 
                                                 
8 In 2008, 6.4 percent of workers held jobs that were not covered by OASDI (Aging Committee 2010). These jobs 
are concentrated in the public sector, and include some federal workers hired before 1984 and some state and local 
workers who receive public pensions but not Social Security. Other uncovered groups include students, low-
earning household workers, and railroad workers. 
9 By law, the cap is not raised in years in which there is no COLA.  In 2012, it will increase to $110,100. 
10 In recent years, about 6 percent of covered workers (around 9 percent of men and 2 percent of women) have had 
earnings above the cap. Many earners exceed the cap just once in their career, while others exceed it in many years 
of their career. How these additional earnings would affect OASDI benefits under the NCFRR proposal depends 
on how they contribute to lifetime earnings. 
11 For details on calculating AIME and PIA, see Social Security Administration (2010). Special calculations apply 
to workers entitled to employer pensions based on work that is not covered by Social Security. 
12 Actuarial reductions apply for claiming early, and delayed retirement credits for postponing past one’s FRA. 
13 When we model this change, we follow the Social Security’s Office of the Chief Actuary’s approach by setting 
the new bend point equal to the first bend point plus 61.5 percent of the difference between the current two bend 
points, rather than using a projected median AIME level from our microsimulation model or from OACT. 
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earnings below the median essentially unharmed, while reducing benefit replacement rates for 
those above the median.14 Figure 1 compares the current and proposed benefit formulas.  
 
Figure 1: Social Security Benefit Formula under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law (with 
Replacement Percentages (in circles) and Bend Points) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Dollar amounts are in 2011 average-wage-indexed terms. No major changes take place in 2034. The figure 
displays that year to illustrate the benefit formula’s features about halfway through the reform’s implementation. 
 
Figure 2 provides another perspective on this formula by displaying the overall share of 
average lifetime earnings OASDI replaces at the FRA under current law and this provision in 
various years. 15 The benefit formula change does not affect the lowest earners—their benefit 
replaces 90 percent of their AIME both under current law and NCFRR’s proposal. In contrast, 
the highest earners’ replacement rate drops about 10 percentage points (from 29 percent to 19 
percent) when the commission’s proposal is fully phased in (2050). In the middle of the 
distribution ($3,093 in AIME, the newly introduced bend point), replacement rates at FRA drop 
by about 1 percentage point (from 46 to 45 percent) under the fully phased-in option.  
 
Retirement age changes 
 
Under current law, a worker can receive a retirement benefit equal to 100 percent of the PIA at 
the FRA, which ranges between 65 and 67 depending on birth year (with a higher FRA for 
those born later). Retired workers can claim benefits as early as age 62, the EEA. However, 
benefits are reduced for each month the worker receives benefits before the FRA to compensate 
                                                 
14 However, low-wage workers receiving benefits on their spouse’s records would see a benefit cut if the spouse’s 
earnings exceeded the new bend point at the median AIME.  
15 As one includes additional provisions from the NCFRR proposal, these rates change further. 
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for the extra months of benefits. Total reductions for claiming at age 62 range from 20 to 30 
percent, again depending on birth year. Benefits are not reduced for disabled workers. 
Nondisabled workers who delay benefit receipt until after the FRA receive increased monthly 
benefits to account for the reduced number of payments. (For a convenient summary of how 
actuarial reductions and delayed retirement credits change across birth years, see Table 1-26 in 
Committee on Ways and Means [2008].) 
 
Figure 2: Social Security Benefit Level at the Full Retirement Age under NCFRR’s Proposal 
and Current Law, as a Percentage of AIME 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Dollar amounts are in 2011 average-wage-indexed terms. No major changes take place in 2034. The figure 
displays that year to illustrate the benefit formula’s features about halfway through the reform’s implementation. 
 
Proponents of increasing retirement ages point to increasing longevity and improved 
health at older ages. For example, a woman born in 1949 who reaches age 62 in 2011 (when 
she qualifies for retirement benefits) can expect to live another 23 years. In contrast, a woman 
born 30 years later (in 1979) who survives to age 62 can expect to live another 25 years, 
whereas a woman born 60 years later (in 2009) can expect to live nearly another 27 years 
beyond age 62. Projected longevity improvements are similar for men. Yet, under current law, 
both the EEA and the FRA are the same for those in the last two cohorts (and for all those born 
1960 and later). The commission recommends indexing the retirement ages to approximate 
longevity gains. It would increase both retirement ages by one month every two years after 
FRA reaches age 67 under current law. At this pace, the FRA would reach 68 in 2046 and 69 in 
2070, while the EEA would increase to 63 and 64 in those years. 
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One concern with increases in retirement age is that longevity gains have been very 
uneven in recent decades, with less educated individuals and those in low-income communities 
experiencing far smaller gains than others (e.g., Meara, Richards, and Cutler 2008, Singh and 
Siahpush 2006, Waldron 2007). To shield those with shorter life expectancies who are least 
likely to be able to work beyond the current EEA, the commission proposal includes a hardship 
exemption. The proposed exemption would shield workers from the increase in the EEA and 
FRA if they have at least 25 years of work before age 62 and have AIMEs below 250 percent 
of the aged federal poverty level (FPL).16 The proposed exemption would phase out for 
workers with AIMEs between 250 and 400 percent of the poverty threshold.17 
 
Figure 3 compares current-law retirement ages with the NCFRR’s proposal. Adults with 
25 work years and AIME that is four or more times the poverty threshold face the full increase 
in both EEA and FRA, as do those with fewer than 25 work years. Those with 25 work years 
and AIME below 2.5 times the poverty threshold are fully exempt, so current-law EEA and 
FRA apply to them. Those with 25 work years but AIME between 2.5 and 4 times the poverty 
threshold face an EEA and FRA that fall somewhere in between.  
 
Figure 3: Retirement Ages under NCFRR’s Proposal and under Current Law 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: We chose the case of an individual with an AIME equal to three times the poverty rate for illustrative purposes. Adults with 25 work 
years and AIME that is four or more times the poverty threshold face the full increase in both EEA and FRA, as do those with fewer than 25 
work years. Those with 25 work years and AIME below 2.5 times the poverty threshold are fully exempt, so the current law EEA and FRA 
apply to them. Those with 25 work years but AIME between 2.5 and 4 times the poverty threshold face an EEA and FRA that fall somewhere 
in between.  
                                                 
16 For this exemption, a year of work is defined as one in which an individual has earns four quarters of coverage. 
A worker in 2011 earns a quarter of coverage for every $1,110 of earnings, up to a maximum of four quarters for 
the year. Covered quarters no longer need to be earned in distinct calendar quarters. 
17 AIME measures economic well-being and risk imperfectly. While other measures of advantage like education 
and wealth tend to be closely correlated with lifetime earnings, some advantaged or highly able individuals do 
choose not to work or to work relatively few years or hours. Testing for work years, as in this proposal, helps with 
targeting to some degree, but this measure is still just a proxy of long-term workforce attachment at low wages. 
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Interestingly, the proposed increases in EEA and FRA do not fully compensate for 
projected longevity increases, and under NCFRR’s proposal overall years spent receiving 
benefits will continue to increase for future generations, even though at a slower rate than under 
current law.18 Figure 4 describes this trend. Expected years in retirement are calculated as of 
age 62 and assume that the individual claims at his or her EEA. These calculations do not 
adjust for differential mortality by gender and socioeconomic status, which complicates this 
picture. Women have significantly longer life expectancy than men, but also lower lifetime 
earnings. Within gender, researchers estimate recent differences in life expectancy between the 
highest and lowest deciles of well-being at age 60 averaged two years (a bit more for men, a bit 
less for women) (Singh and Siahpush 2006). This implies that the gap between the high and 
low lines is likely to be far narrower within genders, assuming recent trends continue. 
 
Figure 4: Expected Years of Benefit Receipt as of Age 62 if Claiming at EEA under NCFRR’s 
Proposal and Current Law Assuming Uniform Life Expectancy by AIME 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: We chose the case of an individual with an AIME equal to 3 times the poverty rate for illustrative purposes. Adults with 25 work years 
and AIME that is four or more times the poverty threshold face the full increase in both EEA and FRA, as do those with fewer than 25 work 
years. Those with 25 work years and AIME below 2.5 times the poverty threshold are fully exempt, so the current law years in retirement apply 
to them. Those with 25 work years but AIME between 2.5 and 4 times the poverty threshold fall somewhere in between. Since EEA is the same 
for both men and women, we used population-weighted life expectancy by cohort, to calculate expected years in retirement.  
 
Allow beneficiaries subject to increases in EEA and FRA to start receiving up to one-half of 
the benefit for which they would be eligible at age 62 
 
Under this provision, all beneficiaries subject to an increase in the EEA would be allowed to 
start receiving one-half of the benefit for which they would be eligible as soon as they turn age 
62, with the other half available independently starting at the revised EEA. Additional actuarial 
reductions would apply to the portion of the benefit taken at age 62, based on the FRA in effect 
at the time. This provision does not affect individuals who are already protected by the 
                                                 
18 According to OACT intermediate forecasts, the difference in life expectancy at age 62 between the 1960 cohort 
(when EEA is 62 and FRA is 67) and the 2008 cohort (when EEA is 64 and FRA is 69) is about three years (2.98 
for men and 2.89 for women), which exceeds the two-year difference in retirement ages. 
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increases in the EEA and FRA through the hardship exemption (i.e., those who have at least 25 
years of work and relatively low average lifetime earnings, AIMEs below 250 percent of the 
aged FPL). Instead, its effects would be concentrated among two very different groups of 
beneficiaries—relatively high lifetime earners, who worked more than 25 years and for whom 
the full increases in EEA and FRA apply, but choose to start receiving benefits early; and 
individuals who have relatively low lifetime earnings but do not meet the years of work criteria 
to be exempt from EEA increases.  Because the provision includes actuarial adjustments to 
attain actuarial neutrality, on a lifetime basis its distributional effects should be minimal even 
though significant changes could appear in cross-sectional projections. 
 
Adopt an alternative measure of CPI, effective in 2012 
 
Most parameters in the OASDI benefit formula (for example, those that determine PIA and the 
contribution and benefit base) are indexed to wages and updated annually. After initial benefit 
determination, however, benefits subsequently grow with price inflation, again on an annual 
basis. The commission suggests basing this cost-of-living adjustment on the chained CPI for all 
urban workers (C-CPI-U) rather than the standard CPI for urban wage earners and clerical 
workers (CPI-W). This is consistent with the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ assessment that the 
chained CPI better approximates true changes in the cost of living, though some analysts point 
out that older Americans’ spending patterns tend to differ from those of the population as a 
whole.19 
 
Provide an enhanced minimum benefit for low-wage workers 
 
Minimum benefits aim to shore up the payments the lowest-wage workers earn. OASDI 
currently provides a special minimum PIA, but its parameters are not wage-indexed so its 
impact is minimal. It now reaches less than 0.15 percent of the caseload.20  
 
To protect long-term workers from poverty after they retire, the commission proposed a 
new special minimum benefit that provides 30-year minimum-wage workers with a benefit 
equivalent to 125 percent of the FPL in 2017 and wage-indexed thereafter.21 The minimum 
benefit would phase down proportionately for workers with fewer than 30 but more than 10 
years of earnings, as Figure 5 illustrates.22 The required number of coverage years to qualify for 
the minimum benefit is proportionately adjusted downward for workers who die or become 
disabled before reaching age 62. As the figure also illustrates, the benefit will increase as a 
share of the poverty level over time (though not as a share of pre-retirement earnings) because 
it is indexed to wages, while the FPL is indexed to prices, which are projected to grow more 
slowly than wages.  
                                                 
19 The Social Security actuaries project that the chained CPI is 0.3 percentage points lower than the CPI-W. The 
Congressional Budget Office (2011) estimates that the chained CPI would be 0.25 percentage points lower than 
the standard CPI over the next decade. For our analyses, we use Social Security’s estimate. See Penner (2010) for 
discussion of differences between inflation indices. 
20 Authors’ calculations from Social Security Administration (2011). See tables 5.A1 and 5.A8. 
21 Again, a qualifying year of work is one in which the individual has earned four quarters of coverage. No credit 
is given for partial work years. 
22 Research suggests that the way the benefit grows with work years is important because low-benefit workers tend 
to have comparatively short work careers. See, for example, Favreault (2010), Favreault and Steuerle (2008). 
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Figure 5: Minimum Benefit for Nondisabled Workers under the NCFRR’s Proposal, in 2017 
Dollars and as a Share of the Federal Poverty Level, in 2017 and 2037 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Enhance benefits for the very old and the long-time disabled 
 
The oldest population is projected to expand rapidly over the coming decades.  For example, 
the number of people over age 85 is projected to increase from 5.8 million in 2010 to 19 
million in 2050. To reduce the risk that these retirees will outlive their resources, the 
commission proposes a new 20-year benefit bump-up that equals 5 percent of the average 
benefit.23 It would begin 20 years after initial eligibility.24 The enhancement is phased in one 
percentage point per year over five years. 
 
Cover newly hired state and local workers after 2020 
 
Even though OASDI now covers about 94 percent of all workers, some states and localities 
exclude their employees from Social Security and instead maintain separate retirement 
systems.25 The commission report contends that relying on this pension model has become 
riskier for both government sponsors and plan participants as the workforce ages and state 
fiscal challenges mount. To increase Social Security’s universality and potentially reduce the 
risk of a federal bailout of state pension plans, the commission proposes to mandate coverage 
                                                 
23 The average benefit is defined as the benefit that a worker who has been earning the Average Wage Index 
throughout his lifetime would be entitled to at the FRA. 
24 Eligibility is defined by the earlier of one’s EEA or year of disability onset, implying that this will increase with 
longevity for retired workers affected by EEA increases under the NCFRR proposal. 
25 States where more than half of state and local government employees were not covered by OASDI in 2007 
included California, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas (Special Committee on Aging 
2010). 
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for all state and local workers newly hired after 2020.26 Such an expansion would boost 
revenues in the short term while incurring obligations over the longer term. 
 
The proposed changes to Social Security were just a subset of the commission’s many 
recommendations to address the nation’s fiscal challenges. Among other recommendations, the 
NCFRR report also proposed overhauling the tax code, which has important implications for 
OASDI and older Americans. However, we do not address those issues in this report. Instead, 
our analysis focuses on expected changes in gross (pre-tax) benefits, rather than net (post-tax) 
benefits. Tax changes would have additional, differential impacts on retirees’ economic well-
being. (For example, benefit reductions for those with incomes above the threshold for taxation 
of OASDI benefits tend to be partially mitigated by lower personal income tax liability under 
proposals that on net reduce benefits.) Tax liabilities would change markedly even under 
current law should Congress enact these—or other substantive—tax proposals. 
 
 
Methods and Analytical Measures 
 
We analyze the effects of the NCFRR proposal using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3, a 
nationally representative, Social Security-focused long-term dynamic microsimulation model. 
DYNASIM starts with a population of about 110,000 individuals and ages them year by year 
through 2086. The model’s starting sample is based on the 1990 to 1993 panels of the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), statistically matched to publicly available 
earnings records (from 1951 through baseline), which allows us to compute OASDI benefits.27 
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix summarize the data and models used in DYNASIM’s 
demographic and economic aging processes, respectively. Many of DYNASIM’s economic and 
demographic outcomes are calibrated to match assumptions used in the 2010 trustees’ report 
(OASDI Board of Trustees 2010).28 
 
We compare the simulated proposal with three alternative representations of current 
law. The first, termed scheduled, assumes that benefits are paid according to current law, using 
existing benefit formulas and provisions. However, because of the system’s long-range 
actuarial imbalance, funds are projected to be insufficient to pay scheduled benefits after 2036. 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) is bound by law to pay benefits only to the extent 
that money is available in the Social Security system to do so.29 The second representation, 
termed payable, assumes that only benefits that can be financed with current-law payroll taxes 
plus trust fund assets will be paid. Since current law contains no statutory or regulatory 
guidance on how to cut benefits to payable levels, we assume that all benefits paid in a given 
year would receive the same percentage reduction (based on SSA actuarial estimates using the 
                                                 
26 Our analyses simplify this provision’s implementation. DYNASIM does not currently model the effects of the 
Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Office. 
27 The earnings records are constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a public-use match of 
Current Population Survey data and administrative earnings records (Smith, Scheuren, and Berk 2002). For more 
detailed information on DYNASIM, see Favreault and Smith (forthcoming). 
28 When simulating over lengthy time horizons such as this, one should be mindful of the uncertainty of key 
assumptions both in the trustees’ assumptions and elsewhere in the model.  (For discussion, see, for example, 
Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods 2011.) 
29 Scott (2009) discusses the complexities of benefit payment under OASDI Trust Fund exhaustion in detail. 
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2010 trustees’ assumptions). These reductions are applied to the final benefit amounts, not the 
AIME or PIA.30 They are not phased in, and they apply equally to current and near 
beneficiaries starting in 2037 (the exhaustion date in the 2010 trustees’ report). The third, 
termed feasible (Bosworth, Burtless, and Keys 2003), assumes that the system is brought into 
long-range balance through an approximately equal combination of benefit reductions and 
payroll tax increases similarly starting in 2037, analogously applying to all beneficiaries and 
taxpayers with no phase in. 
 
These options provide a reasonable range of possibilities. One (scheduled) 
optimistically assumes that the program can pay full benefits without any changes to benefits, 
the second (payable) assumes that benefit reductions shoulder the full burden of bringing the 
system back into fiscal balance, and the third (feasible) lies in between. Each has features that 
are not realistic given historical experience, where grandfathering and phase-in provisions have 
typically been important, but they nonetheless provide usual points of comparison.31 
 
One important aspect of these simulations is that we assume no behavioral responses to 
the commission’s proposed changes to OASDI, except where explicitly noted. Workers in our 
model do not change their work, savings, or Social Security claiming behavior in response to 
the change in available credits or benefits.32 However, we need to modify this assumption when 
we simulate an increase in the EEA, because certain beneficiaries would no longer be able to 
claim at 62. We assume that those individuals who under current law would have chosen to 
claim their benefits earlier than the new EEA would instead claim benefits as soon as they 
qualify. Because of the uncertainties over how people in their early sixties would respond to an 
increase in the EEA, the simulation results should be interpreted cautiously for this age group.33  
 
Our tables and charts describe individuals who are projected to be beneficiaries under 
both current law scheduled and the proposal. Those who gain eligibility but would not qualify 
under current law, or those who lose eligibility under the proposal, do not appear in our 
analysis until they begin receiving benefits. This symmetry facilitates consistent comparison of 
benefits under current law and NCFRR’s proposal, but importantly do not fully capture the 
effects of benefit deferrals (for example due to the EEA increase). Because our results are 
sensitive to these measurement choices and the assumption about behavioral response to the 
EEA increase for those mentioned in the prior paragraph, we display results from a sensitivity 
analysis in which we integrate the commission’s provision for a half benefit available between 
age 62 and an individual’s EEA (when it is greater than age 62). 
                                                 
30 We use OACT projections (using the 2010 trustees’ assumptions) of the combined OASDI trust fund to adjust 
benefits for both OASI and DI recipients, rather than adjusting benefits based on the timing of insolvency and 
financial position of each trust funds separately (i.e., we assume that the funds may borrow from each other). 
31 A fourth counterfactual, presented in a number of OACT publications, is a baseline that resolves solely through 
payroll tax hikes. We do not include this option here, largely for ease of presentation because our analyses focus 
on benefits, with only a subset of tables and figures referencing the payroll tax side. Nor do we include 
counterfactual options that bring the system into balance through changes that take effect earlier than the projected 
year in which the Trust Fund becomes insolvent. 
32 We make these simplifying assumptions in part because of the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of 
possible behavioral responses. 
33 Previous research has found that Social Security retirement ages have significant effects on labor force 
participation and Social Security claiming decisions. See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2009), 
Manchester and Song (2008), and Mastrobuoni (2009).  
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As with the other provisions in the proposal, we assume no behavioral responses to the 
sensitivity analyses. Workers do not change their labor force participation or age of claiming. If 
an individual chooses to claim benefits after age 62 but before his EEA, he will get 50 percent 
of the benefit for which he is eligible as of that age immediately, and the other 50 percent with 
a smaller actuarial reduction as soon as he reaches EEA. We make other detailed assumptions 
about the Retirement Earnings Test (RET) and auxiliary benefits under the half benefit 
provision given ambiguity in the specification.34  
 
We use a range of measures to capture the effects of the changes that the commission 
co-chairs propose. Some of our measures are absolute (such as annual benefit levels measured 
in constant dollars), while others are relative (such as benefits measured as a percentage of 
those that would be paid under current law or as some multiple of the average wage index). 
Both types provide valuable information, given the importance both of meeting absolute 
economic needs and understanding replacement levels and rankings in retirement. This 
diversity of measures and counterfactuals distinguishes our work from earlier studies which 
used fewer metrics (for example, Reno and Walker 2011, Ruffing and Van de Water 2011). 
 
When analyzing effects of the proposal on individuals falling in different earnings 
groups, we use a shared lifetime earnings measure. We define this as the average of indexed 
earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). For married people, 
we average both spouses’ lifetime earnings during a marriage. The index we use is Social 
Security’s Average Wage Index. Quintiles are defined for the OASDI beneficiary population in 
the selected year by birth cohort, not the overall population. The total income measure that we 
use to evaluate changes in the relative income position of OASDI beneficiaries over time 
includes income from earnings (of both spouses, if married), OASDI benefits, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) benefits, defined benefit pensions, annuitized financial assets (including 
401(k)-type assets), income from defined benefit pensions, and income of any adult co-
residents. 
 
 
Effect on Annual Benefits 
 
Figures 6 and 7 present cross-sectional projections of NCFRR’s proposal, comparing benefits 
in the years 2030, 2050, and 2070.35 While Figure 6 focuses on the average benefit under the 
proposal as a percentage of current law scheduled, Figure 7 shows the projected difference in 
average benefits, expressed in real 2010 dollars.36 The proposal would reduce benefits less for 
lower earnings quintiles than for higher quintiles, in both percentage terms and dollar amounts. 
Moreover, the impact becomes more closely related to earnings the further out we project. For 
                                                 
34 Implementing the RET is always challenging.  The earnings test is “overapplied” here, as it is applied to the full 
benefits between age 62 and EEA rather than to half the benefit. In our simulation spousal benefits are affected by 
this provision, only as long as the spouse claims benefits after 62 but before reaching his/her EEA, in which case 
she/he will be also eligible for one half of the benefit. Survivor benefits are affected to the extent that the effective 
age of claiming for the deceased spouse is considered to be the age at which he/she claimed his half benefit. 
35 Table A.3 in the appendix provides more detailed results on Social Security benefits under NCFRR’s proposal 
relative to current law scheduled and current law payable, and across different socioeconomic groups. The table 
contrasts means and medians. 
36 See the appendix for a discussion of alternative measures. 
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example, in 2070 adults in the highest quintile of the earnings distribution can expect to receive 
on average 75 percent of current law scheduled benefits, while those in the bottom quintile will 
receive around 95 percent. Expressed in real 2010 dollar amounts, that equals projected average 
benefit reductions of $8,625 for those in the highest quintile and $460 for those in the lowest, 
compared with current law scheduled. However, it is noteworthy that under NCFRR’s 
proposal, benefits are still projected to continue to grow in real terms for all groups, even 
though at a slower pace than currently scheduled.  
 
Figure 6: Projected Average Adult Social Security Benefits under NCFRR’s Proposal as a 
Percentage of Current Law Scheduled, by Lifetime Earnings Quintiles 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever comes 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Computations include retired and disabled worker beneficiaries and auxiliary beneficiaries 
who are at least age 62. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows a similar picture, but tracks the effects of the proposal continuously over 
time. The initial bump in projected average benefit starting in 2011 results from the increase in 
benefits of up to 5 percent for the very old and the long-time disabled, which the other benefit-
reducing provisions overshadow in later years of the simulation. Figure 8 further illustrates how 
NCFRR’s proposal affects individuals receiving benefits in the lowest, middle, and highest 
earnings quintiles over time. Individuals in the lowest quintile are the least affected—their 
average projected benefits remain consistently above 95 percent of current law scheduled—
while those in the middle and highest quintiles see considerably larger percentage reductions. 
 
 NCFRR’s proposal provides higher benefits for the low-earnings group than the payable 
scenario, which would reduce benefits by 22 percent starting in 2037, or the feasible scenario, 
which would impose half the reduction in the same year. However, this is not the case for 
everyone. Projected benefits under the proposal for those in the top quintile would fall below 
the payable schedule around 2055. For the middle quintile, benefits under NCFRR exceed 
those under the payable schedule for all years from 2037 onward, but they are less than feasible 
benefits starting around 2052. 
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Figure 7: Projected Average Annual Real Adult Social Security Benefits under NCFRR’s 
Proposal and Current Law Scheduled, by Lifetime Earnings Quintile in 2030, 2050, and 2070 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
Figure 8: Average Social Security Benefits as a Percentage of Current Law Scheduled under 
NCFRR’s Proposal, Current Law Payable, and Current Law Feasible by Lifetime Earnings 
Quintile, 2010–2085 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population.  Payable projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI trust fund 
falls below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined 
income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid). 
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One important aspect of these proposals is that not all beneficiaries in a given group can 
expect the same treatment because of many interacting provisions. Figure 9a shows the 
distribution of projected individual benefit changes relative to current law scheduled in 2030, 
2050, and 2070 by gender. In each of the three years shown, men are more likely to experience 
large reductions in their projected individual benefit than women. Across the years, the 
prevalence of larger projected losses increases (consistent with the time path Figure 8 shows, 
where mean benefits as a percentage of current law scheduled benefits decline more in later 
simulation years, especially for those in the highest lifetime earnings quintile). For example, 
about a third of men have projected reductions of greater than 20 percent in 2070.  
 
Figure 9a: Projected Adult Social Security Benefit Changes under NCFRR Relative to Current 
Law Scheduled in 2030, 2050, and 2070, by Gender, No Half Benefit Claiming 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Benefits for individuals. 
 
 
 These projections of benefit changes are sensitive to assumptions about how Social 
Security beneficiaries might change their benefit-claiming behavior in response to the proposal. 
Figure 9b shows the same benefit changes by gender and year, but this time assuming that all 
individuals who claim their benefits prior to the new EEA under current law who are not 
eligible for the hardship exemption under the proposal now elect to take the half benefit at their 
current law claiming age. While the overall story is the same, with benefit reductions of 
increasing size over time and larger benefit reductions for men than for women, the share of 
beneficiaries with very large reductions increases fairly substantially in the later simulation 
years when we allow people to claim the half benefit. For both men and women, the share with 
a reduction of greater than 20 percent in 2070 increases by about 10 percentage points 
(somewhat more for men and less for women). This underscores the importance of the 
population that is included in a distributional table. Individuals not receiving a benefit (because 
they were assumed not to claim a half benefit) are not included in Figure 9a, but they appear in 
Figure 9b with a benefit that is reduced by about 50 percent. This increases the share who 
appear in the category indicating a benefit reduction of 20 percent or greater (in some but not 
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all cases falling into this reduction category is temporary until they reach the EEA). As a result, 
a provision intended to make workers who want to claim early better off than they would have 
been with a stricter EEA increase makes more people appear worse off in the (cross-sectional) 
distributional table. (On a lifetime basis, we would expect smaller effects, given that the 
optional half benefit was intended to be roughly actuarially neutral.) 
 
Figure 9b: Projected Adult Social Security Benefit Changes under NCFRR Relative to Current 
Law Scheduled in 2030, 2050, and 2070, by Gender, All Current Law Early Claimants 
Ineligible for Full Hardship Exemption Claim Half Benefit 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Benefits for individuals. 
 
Similarly, within lifetime earnings groups (Figures 10a and 10b), we see increasing 
prevalence in larger projected benefit reductions in the later years and sensitivity to 
assumptions about the claiming of the half benefit. Once more, a distinct pattern by lifetime 
earnings emerges, with far more significant projected reductions more prevalent in the higher 
lifetime earnings quintile. Again, shares with very large reductions increase notably when 
individuals are allowed to claim the half benefit. Interestingly, the changes tend to be largest in 
the lowest lifetime earnings quintile (where a significant fraction of beneficiaries do not qualify 
for the hardship exemption because of relatively few work years), followed by the third and 
fourth quintiles. Change tends to be smallest in the highest quintile, where most beneficiaries 
were already classified as being in the group with a reduction of greater than 20 percent, 
followed by the second quintile, where a significant share qualify for the hardship exemption. 
These two figures, considered in tandem with Figures 9a and 9b, reveal that the average or 
median situation reflects a significant diversity of experiences within these groups, and that 
projections are sensitive to underlying assumptions.  
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Figure 10a: Projected Adult Social Security Benefit Changes under NCFRR Relative to 
Current Law Scheduled in 2030, 2050, and 2070, by Lifetime Earnings Quintile, No Half 
Benefit Claiming 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810).  
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
Figure 10b: Projected Adult Social Security Benefit Changes under NCFRR Relative to 
Current Law Scheduled in 2030, 2050, and 2070, by Lifetime Earnings Quintile, All Current 
Law Early Claimants Ineligible for Full Hardship Exemption Claim Half Benefit  
0 0 1 1 3
4 3
9
20
32
19 16
38
61
80
0 1
1 1 4
13
20
24
5
8
11
11
7
1 2
3
6
11
16
19
17
12 12
12
10
4
2 4
13
22
31
30
32
31
27
20
15
28
21
11
5
76
81
75
68
60
33
42
27
14
5
27
29
16
6
3
22
14
10
6
2
25
9
3 1 1
21
7
2 1 0
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
BottomSecondMiddle Fourth Top BottomSecondMiddle Fourth Top BottomSecondMiddle Fourth Top
Pe
rce
nt 
wi
th 
be
ne
fit 
ch
an
ge 
of 
giv
en
 siz
e
Year and lifetime earnings quintile
no change or higher
< 5 % lower
5-9.99%  lower
10-14.99% lower
15-19.99% lower
>=20%  lower
207020502030
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810).  
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
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Another way to illustrate how diverse benefits are is to show the full distribution of 
projected outcomes in a single graph.  Figures 11a and 11b do this for benefits in 2050 and 
2070, respectively, separately by shared lifetime earnings quintiles.  (For ease of presentation, 
we show results for only the highest, middle, and lowest lifetime earnings quintiles.) The 
figures contrast benefits under all three versions of current law (scheduled, feasible, and 
payable) with option benefits. Along the horizontal axis is each successive percentile of the 
distribution (excluding the 100th percentile, again for ease of presentation), while the vertical 
axis displays the projected value for benefit in real (2010) dollars at that percentile.   
 
Figure 11a:  Distribution of Annual Social Security Benefits in 2050 under Current Law 
(Scheduled, Feasible, and Payable) and NCFRR Proposal, by Shared Lifetime Earnings 
Quintile (Lowest, Middle, and Highest) 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810).  
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
One striking feature of Figures 11a and 11b is how benefits under the NCFRR proposal 
flatten relative to current law scheduled for the highest lifetime earnings quintile.  By 2070, for 
example, the highest quintile tracks the current law scheduled middle quintile throughout the 
distribution.  In the lowest earnings quintile, in contrast, benefits look quite similar under 
current law scheduled and the NCFRR option in 2050. Under the option, benefits fall just 
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below current law scheduled in 2070.  In both years, the NCFRR proposal leads to higher 
benefits than under the feasible or payable counterfactuals for most of the distribution for this 
lowest quintile.  For the middle quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution, those with 
relatively low benefits (roughly, in the lower three-fifths) have higher benefits under NCFRR 
than current law feasible in 2050.  By 2070, a far greater share, about four-fifths, of middle-
quintile beneficiaries would have higher benefits under current law feasible.     
 
Figure 11b:  Distribution of Annual Social Security Benefits in 2070 under Current Law 
(Scheduled, Feasible, and Payable) and NCFRR Proposal, by Shared Lifetime Earnings 
Quintile (Lowest, Middle, and Highest) 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810).  
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
 
Incremental Effects of Individual Provisions 
 
To better understand what drives these results, we next look at effects on annual benefits when 
we implement NCFRR’s provisions sequentially. We consider outcomes in 2070, when the 
proposals’ provisions have been fully implemented. As Figure 12 shows, increasing the taxable 
maximum and changing the benefit formula reduce projected benefits for all earnings groups. 
Because NCFRR’s proposal exempts individuals with AIME values below the median from 
changes to the benefit formula, the projected effect of this provision on those in the lowest 
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quintile is small—less than 1 percent of benefits. It increases to 19 percent for those in the 
highest income quintile. 
 
Next we add the adequacy adjustments in the form of the new minimum benefit and the 
old-age/disability bump-up. As expected, these have positive effects on benefits across earnings 
groups and lower the projected benefit reductions. For individuals in the lowest quintile, these 
two provisions more than offset the effect of the PIA formula change and turn the projected 
change in 2070 benefits under the proposal from a reduction to an increase of 3.8 percent. 
 
Figure 12: Projected Cumulative Effect of NCFRR Provision on Average Social Security 
Benefits as a Percentage of Current Law Scheduled by Lifetime Earnings Quintile in 2070 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
 
Next we implement the COLA adjustment, which substitutes the chained CPI-U for the 
current version of the CPI and reduces the COLA by 0.3 percentage points according to the 
Social Security actuaries’ projections. By itself, this provision roughly reduces benefits across 
earnings groups by 4 percentage points compared with current law scheduled. This is a 0.3 
percentage point benefit cut in the first year and compounds over time to 1 percent after 3 years 
and 6 percent after 22 years. Once the COLA reduction is added, the positive effect of the 
adequacy provisions disappears and the overall expected change in projected benefits under the 
proposal is negative for all groups—ranging from -1.0 to -21.4 percent. 
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The last two provisions we implement are the increases in retirement ages, combined 
with the hardship exemption. That completes the simulation and results in the numbers seen 
earlier—projected benefit reductions relative to current law scheduled ranging from 3.0 percent 
for those in the lowest quintile to 24.5 percent for those in the highest.37 
 
 
Comparisons of Benefits to Lifetime Earnings and Payroll Taxes 
 
The replacement rate—defined here as the ratio of first-year benefits to average career 
earnings—provides a different perspective on the effects of the commission’s proposal relative 
to current law. Figure 13 shows projected median household replacement rates calculated for 
individuals and couples who first start receiving Social Security benefits in 2070.38 (See table 
A.5 in the appendix for projected replacement rates in additional years.) The progressive nature 
of Social Security’s benefit formula means that under current law, replacement rates are higher 
for workers who have lower earnings. Indeed, as Figure 13, shows median projected scheduled 
household replacement rates in 2070 are 71 percent for those in the lowest lifetime earnings 
quintile, compared to 44 percent for those in the middle and 33 percent for those in the highest. 
 
As previously noted, the payable and feasible scenarios cut benefits by the same 
percentage for all earnings groups. This is reflected in the projected replacement rate 
reductions, which average around 22 percent across groups for payable and about half that for 
feasible. This is not the case, however, under NCFRR’s proposal. Figure 13 shows a very clear 
relationship between earnings and replacement rate reductions, with those at the bottom of the 
distribution largely shielded under the proposal. The proposal replaces a smaller share of pre-
retirement earnings than under current law payable for those in the top two quintiles and a 
larger share than under current law feasible for the bottom two quintiles. (Table A.5 also shows 
the projected replacement rates by gender, education, and lifetime earnings.) 
 
To get a broader picture of the effects of the proposal, it is informative not only to 
consider what beneficiaries receive from Social Security at a particular point in time, but also to 
look at what they get in return for their contributions on a lifetime basis. Payroll tax payments 
are also a factor in economic well-being, and our analyses thus far have focused solely on 
benefits. Figure 14 presents the projected ratios of lifetime benefits to lifetime taxes by 
earnings quintile for individuals born between 1971 and 1975 (who would be significantly 
exposed to the effects of NCFRR’s proposal) assuming a very modest interest rate.39 
 
                                                 
37 Our assumption that for the most part workers do not change their Social Security claiming behavior or increase 
their labor force participation also affects the losses resulting from the retirement age increases. 
38 The analysis includes all beneficiaries older than 18, regardless of the type of benefit received—retired worker, 
disability, spousal, or survivor, though the latter two categories of auxiliary benefits are only assigned at ages 62 
and older. In the case of married couples, the replacement rate is calculated in the first year in which both spouses 
are collecting benefits. The denominator is the individual’s AIME, or for couples the sum of their AIMEs.  
39 We count payroll taxes paid by both the employee and his or her employer when computing an individual’s 
lifetime taxes. The sample includes individuals who survive until at least age 30, and therefore includes 
individuals who die before collecting any OASDI benefits as long as they made payroll contributions. We use a 
real discount rate of 2 percent when accumulating both benefits and payroll taxes. 
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Figure 13: Projected Median First-Year Household Social Security Replacement Rates under 
NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law by Lifetime Earnings Quintile in 2070. 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. 
 
 
Figure 14: Projected Median Ratio of Lifetime Individual Social Security Benefits to 
Contributions under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law for Individuals Born Between 1971 
and 1975, by Lifetime Earnings Quintile  
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the 
selected year by cohort, not the overall population. The real discount rate for accumulating both contributions and benefits is 2 percent. 
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Under current law scheduled, for these cohorts the median beneficiary in all earnings 
groups except the top quintile is projected to receive more in benefits than he or she pays in 
taxes. The difference is substantial for those with limited earnings. For the median beneficiary 
in the bottom earnings quintile, for example, projected lifetime benefits exceed projected 
lifetime taxes by 61 percent. Almost half roughly break even in the top earnings quintile, where 
the projected median ratio stands at 0.93.  
 
The story is quite different under current law payable. The median beneficiary overall 
about breaks even, as the median ratio in the middle earnings quintile reaches 0.98. But those 
who earn more pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits. Benefits received by the median 
beneficiary in the top earnings quintile, for example, amount to only 75 percent of taxes paid. 
And the bonuses received by those in the lower earnings quintiles are much smaller than under 
current law scheduled. The feasible baseline falls between current law scheduled and current 
law payable for each of the income quintiles. 
 
The NCFRR’s proposal would accentuate the existing difference between low and high 
earners in the ratio of lifetime benefits to taxes. Under the proposal, the projected median ratio 
would approach the current law scheduled ratio (and exceed the feasible ratio) for those in the 
bottom three earnings quintiles, while it would approach the current law payable ratio (and be 
less than the feasible ratio) for those in the top two earnings quintiles. Thus, the proposal is 
projected to concentrate benefit reductions and payroll tax increases in the top quintiles, and 
largely shield those in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution. Even in the top quintile, 
however, the median beneficiary has somewhat higher projected benefits under the NCFRR’s 
proposal than under current law payable (but not feasible) benefits. (Table A.6 in the appendix 
provides additional distributional results, including for earlier cohorts.) 
 
 As with the cross-sectional projections, these projections of lifetime median ratios mask 
important variability among individuals with similar lifetime earnings. Once more, we thus 
display projections of changes, this time the change in the ratio of lifetime benefits to lifetime 
contributions (Figure 15). Here, we contrast the 1971 to 1975 birth cohort shown above with 
their immediate predecessors in the 1966 to 1970 birth cohort and their immediate successors in 
the 1976 to 1980 birth cohort to show how the NCFRR proposal phases in across the cohorts. 
These projections similarly reveal a strong relationship between lifetime earnings and projected 
reductions in the ratio of lifetime benefits to lifetime contributions, which grow over time. 40 In 
the lowest lifetime earnings quintile, the most prevalent change in the projected benefit to tax 
ratio (relative to current law scheduled) is less than 5 percent, even in the latest birth cohort 
(1976–80). In the highest lifetime earnings quintile, the modal change grows from 10–14.99 
percent in the first birth cohort (1966–70) to greater than 20 percent in the middle (1971–75) 
                                                 
40 Several factors contribute to differences between interpretation of these lifetime measures with the cross-
sectional ones. First, the inclusion of payroll taxes in the ratios will tend to show greater lifetime percentage 
reductions for higher earners, as only those with earnings above the taxable maximum see their payroll tax 
increase in any year, and such individuals are concentrated in the highest quintile. Second, because the measure 
includes individuals who die prior to receiving benefits, and these individuals are disproportionately low earners, 
weights across the quintiles differ, so the lower quintiles will have proportionately more individuals whose ratios 
do not change because their benefits are zero under both current law and the option. Third, the lifetime measure 
helps to smooth out transitory anomalies that can arise, for example due to changing application (and effects) of 
the Retirement Earnings Test between current law and the NCFRR option. 
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and last (1976–80) cohorts. (This latest cohort reaches the current law EEA between 2038 and 
2042, to provide some context with the cross-sectional projections shown earlier. We finish 
with the 1976–80 cohorts, as they are the last for which we have projections of a full lifetime of 
benefits for effectively the entire cohort, recognizing that later cohorts are still experiencing the 
proposal’s full phase-in.) 
 
Figure 15: Projected Change in Ratio of Lifetime Individual Social Security Benefits to 
Contributions under NCFRR’s Proposal Relative to Current Law Scheduled for Individuals 
Born Between 1966 and 1970, 1971 and 1975, and 1976 to 1980 by Lifetime Earnings Quintile  
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the cohort, not the overall population. The real 
discount rate for accumulating both contributions and benefits is 2 percent. Individuals who die before receiving Social Security benefits are 
included in the tabulations if they make payroll tax contributions and survive to at least age 30. 
 
Figure 16 further illustrates heterogeneity in Social Security experiences by showing the 
full distribution of projected ratios of lifetime benefits to lifetime contributions for individuals 
born between 1971 and 1975 under both current law (scheduled, payable, and feasible) and the 
NCFRR proposal. (For ease of presentation, we just show three quintiles and cap the ratio at 5.) 
For individuals in the lowest lifetime earnings quintile, these projected ratios are strikingly 
skewed under current law. Many low lifetime earners make contributions to Social Security but 
either do not survive to receive benefits or do not work enough quarters to qualify for benefits. 
Others receive very high returns on their payroll tax contributions. This occurs both because of 
progressivity in the benefit formula and because of spouse and survivor benefits paid to low-
earning spouses who may not have made many payroll tax contributions. For these low lifetime 
earners, the difference in projected ratios between current law scheduled and the NCFRR 
option is relatively modest throughout the distribution. For the higher lifetime earners, in 
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contrast, outcomes are less skewed under current law. Most beneficiaries have benefit to 
contribution ratios that fall between 0.5 and 1.5 under current law scheduled. However, there is 
far greater divergence between the ratios under scheduled benefits and the NCFRR option for 
these higher earners, with most receiving returns to their contributions under the option that are 
substantially lower than current law scheduled; indeed, for much of the distribution of higher 
earners, these ratios closely track current law payable ratios. 
 
Figure 16: Projected Distribution of Ratio of Lifetime Individual Social Security Benefits to 
Contributions under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law for Individuals Born Between 1971 
and 1975, by Lifetime Earnings Quintile (Lowest, Middle, and Highest)  
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Notes: Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of indexed earnings from ages 22 through 62 (or year of disability, whichever is 
first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the cohort, not the overall population. The real 
discount rate for accumulating both contributions and benefits is 2 percent. Individuals who die before receiving Social Security benefits are 
included in the tabulations if they make payroll tax contributions and survive to at least age 30. 
 
 
How Do Beneficiaries Fare Relative to a Low-Income Standard? 
 
Figure 17 reports the percentage of Social Security beneficiaries with low incomes, defined as 
less than a quarter of the earnings of the average worker, in 2030, 2050, and 2070.41 We focus 
                                                 
41 In 2011, a quarter of Social Security’s Average Wage Index equals $11,172, roughly equivalent to the FPL 
today. For those age 65 and older living alone, the 2011 FPL is $10,458. We use a slightly higher threshold when 
defining low-income married couples, to reflect the greater consumption needs for two-person households than for 
those living alone. Because the FPL assumes that a two-person aged household needs 126 percent more income 
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on this relative income position measure (which we can think of as akin to wage-indexed 
poverty) rather than a more standard poverty measure because initial Social Security benefits 
are indexed to wages, while the poverty threshold is indexed to prices. Because wages are 
projected to grow faster than inflation, projected poverty rates for Social Security beneficiaries 
will decline over time and become very low over the next 60 years.42 As a result, the impact of 
the NCFRR’s proposal on future poverty rates is less informative than other measures. Relating 
incomes to average wages tells us how beneficiaries fare relative to the working population 
over time.  
 
Figure 17: Share of Adult Beneficiaries with Income Less than 25 Percent of the Average 
Wage Index in 2030, 2050, and 2070 under Current Law and NCFRR’s Proposal  
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
In 2030, the model projects that slightly more beneficiaries will have low incomes 
under NCFRR’s proposal than current law scheduled, feasible, and payable, likely due to the 
COLA shift to the C-CPI-U. This is, however, no longer true in 2050 and 2070. As the results 
show, in those years more Social Security beneficiaries are projected to have low incomes 
under the proposal than under current law scheduled, although fewer than under current law 
payable (or feasible). The proposal is projected to provide stronger protection for low-income 
beneficiaries than across-the-board reductions. Compared to feasible benefits, the proposal also 
is projected to shield comparably more beneficiaries from low income, though the differences 
are less striking than for payable. (Table A.7 in the appendix shows results by gender, 
education and lifetime earnings).  
                                                                                                                                                           
than a one-person household, our low-income threshold for couples equals 126 percent of one-fourth of the 
Average Wage Index (or $14,095 in 2011). 
42 Overall, using the conventional measure of poverty, the NCFRR’s proposal has only modest effects on projected 
poverty rates for the population receiving Social Security benefits, as it tracks closely the ones under current law. 
Instead, focusing on a more time-consistent measure of relative income position gives us a better idea of how the 
proposal compares with current law scheduled, payable, and feasible.  
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Summary 
 
The NCFRR proposal would substantially reduce the Social Security benefits received 
by adults relative to benefits currently scheduled. In 2070, when all of the proposed provisions 
are fully phased in, average benefits are projected to decline by 14 percent for those in the 
middle of the earnings distribution. The proposal largely preserves scheduled benefits for those 
in the bottom earnings quintile. Even those beneficiaries, however, would experience a 
projected 3 percent benefit reduction—despite the inclusion of several benefit enhancements 
for recipients with low lifetime earnings—primarily because of the proposed COLA changes. 
Projected benefits would fall by about a quarter for those in top earnings quintile. As a result, 
their projected first-year replacement rates from Social Security will decline markedly for 
future generations, along with their return from the payroll taxes they pay over their lifetimes. 
These declining returns could erode political support for OASDI. 
 
Ultimately, how one evaluates outcomes under the commission plan depends on the 
alternatives to which one compares it, coupled with one’s views about the best way to share the 
burden of bringing OASDI into long-run fiscal balance within and between generations. An 
important aspect of this inter- and intragenerational sharing is the chosen balance between 
increased payroll taxes and benefit reductions. The proposal generally leaves beneficiaries in 
the bottom four lifetime earnings quintiles with higher benefits than they would receive under a 
payable baseline (under which Social Security is not changed at all in the near term and 
beneficiaries faced across-the-board benefit reductions once the Trust Funds are exhausted). 
Compared to a feasible baseline (under which action is similarly deferred until Trust Fund 
exhaustion, but at that point restores balance though an even division between benefit 
reductions and payroll tax increases), relatively fewer beneficiaries have higher benefits, but 
the lower two quintiles still do comparably well. 
 
These analyses of the NCFRR proposal and the counterfactuals that describe Social 
Security benefits when action is deferred until the Trust Fund becomes insolvent clearly 
illustrate the importance of early action on Social Security’s fiscal challanges. If Congress 
waits until the Trust Fund is exhausted, the required adjustments to OASDI benefits and/or 
payroll taxes would need to be considerable. Congress could avert these sorts of adjustments by 
phasing in provisions over the next two and a half decades.43 Further, the relative shares of the 
long-range deficit that are closed from revenues and from benefit reductions could be shifted to 
one with a heavier reliance on revenue increases relative to benefit reductions. 
 
Finally, our sensitivity analyses reveal both how important choices about measures and 
behavioral response can be and how uncertain projections into the distant future are. While the 
bottom line story about the NCFRR proposal is fairly consistent across the sensitivity analyses 
and alternative measures, values for any particular projected outcome can differ markedly 
depending on details of how the measure is calculated or which underlying assumptions 
                                                 
43 According to projections in the Trustees report (OASDI Board of Trustees. 2010), the permanent and immediate 
payroll tax hike required in 2011 to bring long-term balance would be 2.15 percentage points and the analogous 
benefit reduction would be 13.8 percent.  If Congress defers action until 2036, the required payroll tax hike 
increases to 4.00 (with further hikes to 4.50 by 2085) and the benefit reduction increases to 23 percent 
(increasing.to 26 percent by 2085).   
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analysts select. This high degree of sensitivity underscores the importance of focusing on 
relative differences across options (including counterfactuals like payable or feasible) using 
consistent metrics, rather than focusing on any particular percentage or other value to 
summarize a complex set of interacting provisions like those in the NCFRR proposal. 
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Appendix 
 
Comparing Current Law to NCFRR’s Proposal: The Importance of Different Measures 
 
Analysts can use a wide variety of statistical measures to compare projected benefits under the 
proposal with benefits under current law. When assessing the effects of proposals, and 
especially when comparing results among studies, it is important to bear in mind differences 
between those measures. 
 
The primary measure that we use for much of the analysis in the report is the average 
benefit under the proposal as a percentage of the average benefit under current law scheduled, 
which we could also call the ratio of averages. Alternatively, one might be interested in the 
effect of the proposal on the individual in the middle of the distribution, who could be viewed 
as the typical beneficiary. A measure capturing that effect would be the median ratio, produced 
by calculating each individual’s benefit under the proposal as a percentage of his or her current 
law scheduled benefit and then finding the midpoint of this distribution of individual values. 
Half of the individuals in a given group would experience a percentage change in their benefits 
lower than the median, and half would see a higher percentage change. A third alternative 
measure would be the average ratio, produced by calculating each individual’s benefit under 
the proposal as a percentage of his or her current law benefit and then averaging these 
individual ratios.  
 
There is an essential difference between the ratio of averages and the average ratio 
measures. In the latter calculation, those receiving relatively small benefits will have greater 
effects on the average than those receiving larger benefits, because the same dollar-amount 
difference in benefits will result in a higher percentage change for someone with low benefits 
under current law than someone with higher benefits. The analysis in the brief focuses on the 
ratio of averages measure (supplemented by analyses of distributions of benefits and benefit 
changes on both an annual and lifetime basis), mainly because we believe it better illustrates 
the overall effect of the proposal on the average benefit for a group. It is less influenced by 
extreme values, such as when NCFRR’s proposal results in changes that are small in levels but 
quite high in percentage terms for a modest number of cases. The median ratio has the 
attractive feature of being less susceptible to outliers than other statistics.  
 
A simple numerical example will help to illustrate the differences among the three 
measures. Let us assume the population of Social Security beneficiaries consists of five 
hypothetical individuals. Table A8 shows potential monthly benefits under current law and 
under the proposal for each individual, as well as dollar and percent differences between the 
two. Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are equivalent in terms of the dollar value of all benefits under the 
proposal as compared to current law. The ratio of averages measure, which is calculated as the 
ratio of the average benefit under the proposal over the average scheduled benefit under current 
law, illustrates this: It is constant across the three scenarios.  
 
The average ratio measure, however, changes depending on whether the benefits under 
the proposal are more generous toward those with relatively low benefits or those with 
relatively high benefits. The average ratio is produced by calculating for each individual the 
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benefit under the proposal as a percentage of current law scheduled, and then averaging across 
individuals. Scenario 2 differs from scenario 1 by increasing the poorest individual’s benefit by 
$50 and taking the difference from the individual with the highest benefit. The resulting 
average ratio increases from 97 to 98 percent. Scenario 3 does the reverse: A smaller reduction 
(of $50) in the benefit of the individual with the highest current law benefit is compensated by 
an equivalent $50 decrease in benefit under the proposal for the individual with the lowest. As 
a result, the average ratio goes down to 95 percent. Overall, the average ratio measure has the 
potential to be more susceptible to slight nuances in the distribution of benefit 
reductions/increases compared to the the other two measures.  
 
Figure A.1 illustrates how using different metrics can lead to different conclusions 
about the magnitude of the NCFRR proposal’s effects for the representative population, not just 
hypothetical individuals. The figure shows that in the DYNASIM simulations, the average 
ratio measure consistently falls higher than the ratio of averages. The reason is that the 
NCFRR proposal includes provisions to protect long-term low earners from increases in the 
retirement ages, as well as a minimum benefit and long-term beneficiary increase, which in 
some cases can result in certain individuals having higher projected benefits under the proposal 
than under current law. Although the benefit increases are small in absolute terms, they can be 
substantial in percentage terms, because those receiving the bonuses are primarily low-income 
individuals.44 Hence, even a small number of such cases could push the average ratio measure 
above the ratio of averages and could lead one to underestimate the proposal’s overall benefit 
reductions. The further out in the projection period we look, the higher (in percentage terms) 
the projected benefits under the provision become relative to current law (for such low-earning 
individuals), and as a result the greater is the difference between the two measures.  
 
The projected median ratio is also consistently higher than the ratio of averages 
measure, but for a different reason. A number of NCFRR’s provisions protect low earners from 
benefit reductions.  For example, the benefit formula change explicitly shields workers below 
the median lifetime earnings from changes. As a result, the individual in the middle distribution 
appears to be less affected by the proposal compared with the effect on the overall dollar value 
of benefits received by the group.  
 
Importantly, how these measures differ from one another can vary by characteristics. 
Table A3, for example, reveals that in both 2030 and 2050 the average and median ratios differ 
more in the middle shared lifetime earnings quintiles than elsewhere in the lifetime earnings 
distribution. 
 
A number of other choices can markedly affect distributional projections.45 For 
example, the unit of analysis (whether one analyzes benefits on an individual or a family basis) 
has very important effects on the results. In these analyses, we have focused on individual 
                                                 
44 Changes to the applicability of the Retirement Earnings Test that coincide with FRA increases can also lead to 
large changes in benefits at a point in time. For example, many beneficiaries with earnings who are not below the 
FRA under current law may be below the FRA—and thus subject to withholding under the RET—under the 
option. This could significantly their change cross-sectional outcomes.  However, these changes are typically 
offset later in life through changes to the actuarial reduction factor to account for months in which benefits are 
fully withheld, implying that this would have minimal effect on lifetime outcomes. 
45 Toder (2008) provides additional discussion of these issues. 
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metrics, but do use family (i.e., couple) metrics to describe replacement rates. We have 
computed these couple level measures for all analyses. Whether one uses pre- or post-tax 
benefits is also important, given that OASDI benefits are subject to federal income taxation for 
workers with income above certain thresholds.  As these thresholds are not indexed for 
inflation, this choice will be increasingly important in coming decades. 
 
 
Figure A.1: Comparison of “Ratio of Averages,” “Average Ratio,” and “Median Ratio” for 
Assessing Adult Social Security Benefits under NCFRR’s Proposal as a Percentage of Current 
Law Scheduled, 2010–2085 
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Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
Note: Axis does not start at zero. 
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Appendix Table 1: Core Demographic Processes in DYNASIM 
 
Process Data Form and predictors 
 
Birth  NLSY (1979–
94), NLSY97 
(1997–2005), 
VS, OACT 2010 
Seven-equation parity progression model; varies based on marital 
status; predictors include age, marriage duration, time since last 
birth; uses vital rates after age 39; sex of newborn assigned by 
race; probability of multiple birth assigned by age and race. 
   
Death  SIPP (2001–04), 
OACT 2010 
Three equations; time trend from OACT 1992–2075; includes 
socioeconomic differentials, health status, and ADLs/IADLs; 
separate process for the disabled based on age, sex, and disability 
duration derived from Zayatz (2005). 
   
Immigration SIPP (1990–93), 
OACT 2010 
Observed immigrants from historical data are used as donors. 
Targets are derived from OACT. 
   
First marriage NLSY (1979–
93), NCHS 
Eight discrete-time logistic hazard models for persons age 15 to 
34; depends on age, education, race, earnings, presence of 
children (for females); uses Vital Statistics rates at older ages. 
   
Remarriage NCHS Table lookups; separate by sex for widowed and divorced.  
   
Mate 
matching 
NA Closed marriage market (spouse must be selected from among 
unmarried, opposite-sex persons in the population); match 
likelihood depends on age, race, education. 
   
Divorce PSID (1985–93) Couple-level outcome; discrete-time logistic hazard model 
depends on marriage duration, age and presence of children, 
earnings of both spouses. (A separate model predicts separation.) 
   
Leaving home NLSY (1979–
94) 
Three equations; family size, parental resources, and school and 
work status are predictors. 
   
Living 
arrangements 
SIPP (1990–93) Projected at age 62 and older; predictors include number of 
children ever born, income sources, demographic characteristics.  
   
Education NLSY (1979–
94), CPS (1995–
98)  
Ten cross-tabulations based on age, race, sex, and parents’ 
education. 
   
Disability SIPP (1990–93) Discrete-time logistic hazard model incorporates various 
socioeconomic differences (age, education, lifetime earnings, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, and nativity). 
   
Health status 
(Age 51+) 
HRS (1992–
2006) 
Ordered logit models (initial conditions for those not observed on 
the SIPP, and then lagged status-specific transition models) 
incorporate various socioeconomic differences (age, education, 
lifetime earnings, race/ethnicity, marital status, and nativity). 
   
Limitations in 
(instrumental) 
activities of 
daily living  
HRS (1994–
2006) 
Ordered logit models (initial conditions for those not observed on 
the SIPP, and then lagged status-specific transition models) 
incorporate health status. IADLs predict ADLs. 
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Appendix Table 2: Core Economic Processes in DYNASIM 
 
Process Data Form and predictors 
Labor supply 
and earnings 
PSID (1981–
2007), NLSY 
(1979–89), 
OACT 2010 
 
Separate participation, hours decisions, wage rates for 16 age-
race-sex groups; all equations have permanent and transitory error 
components; key predictors include marital status, education 
level, age splines, region of residence, disability status, whether 
currently in school, birth cohort, job tenure, health status, Social 
Security beneficiary status, and education level interacted with 
age splines; also number and ages of children. Model forms vary 
by outcomes. Special processes project earnings for the highest 
earners.  
   
Saving/ 
Consumption 
SIPP, PSID 
(1984–94), 
HRS, SIPP 
1990–93 
matched to 
administrative 
data (1951–99) 
Separate models estimated for housing and nonhousing wealth 
based on income and demographic characteristics using random 
effects and annual hazard models; each model includes an 
individual-specific error term. 
  
Benefits sector  
OASI  SIPP (2001–
2004) matched 
to administrative 
data (1951–
2007) 
Benefit claiming simulated beginning at age 62; model uses 
discrete-time hazard models to determine age at take-up based on 
age, benefit amount, spousal characteristics, and Social Security 
policy parameters. 
   
DI  SIPP (1990–93) 
matched to 
administrative 
data (1951–99) 
Benefit claiming predicted through discrete-time hazard model 
including age, education, lifetime earnings, race, ethnicity, 
marital status, nativity, and disability status in t - 1.  
   
SSI  SIPP (1990–93) 
matched to 
administrative 
data (1951–99) 
Uses program rules (income and asset tests) to determine 
eligibility and a participation function based on potential benefit 
and demographic and economic characteristics including age, 
education, race, family structure, home ownership, and sources of 
income. 
 
Acronyms: ADLs = activities of daily living; CPS = Current Population Survey; DI = Disability Insurance (Social 
Security); HRS = Health and Retirement Study; IADLs = instrumental activities of daily living; NA = not 
applicable; NCHS = National Center for Health Statistics; NLMS = National Longitudinal Mortality Study; NLSY 
= National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; OASI = Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (Social Security); OACT 
2010 = intermediate assumptions of the 2010 OASDI Trustees Report; PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics; 
SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation; VS = Vital Statistics. 
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Table A3: Adult Social Security Benefits under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law in 2030, 2050, and 2070 
 
 
Average, 
$2010
Average, 
$2010
Average Median Average Average Average, 
$2010
Average, 
$2010
Average Median Average Average Average, 
$2010
Average, 
$2010
Average Median Average Average
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
ALL $16,420 $15,805 96.3 96.2 100.0 100.0 $19,728 $17,630 89.4 93.1 89.9 79.8 $24,161 $20,236 83.8 89.2 88.9 77.8
GENDER
Men $17,694 $16,977 95.9 96.0 100.0 100.0 $20,946 $18,519 88.4 92.4 89.9 79.8 $25,406 $21,031 82.8 88.4 88.9 77.8
Women $15,314 $14,787 96.6 96.3 100.0 100.0 $18,653 $16,845 90.3 93.6 89.9 79.8 $23,054 $19,529 84.7 89.7 88.9 77.8
AGE
18 - 34 $15,549 $15,144 97.4 98.3 100.0 100.0 $21,068 $19,650 93.3 96.8 89.9 79.8 $24,478 $22,764 93.0 96.9 88.9 77.8
35 - 49 $15,070 $14,617 97.0 97.4 100.0 100.0 $19,594 $18,285 93.3 96.0 89.9 79.8 $25,051 $22,880 91.3 95.7 88.9 77.8
50 - 59 $15,888 $15,470 97.4 97.8 100.0 100.0 $19,363 $18,002 93.0 96.4 89.9 79.8 $24,816 $22,703 91.5 95.9 88.9 77.8
60 - 61 $16,372 $15,848 96.8 97.4 100.0 100.0 $20,115 $18,609 92.5 96.0 89.9 79.8 $25,717 $23,429 91.1 95.7 88.9 77.8
62 - 64 $14,169 $13,405 94.6 96.3 100.0 100.0 $16,909 $15,187 89.8 95.6 89.9 79.8 $21,297 $18,755 88.1 94.9 88.9 77.8
65 - 69 $16,145 $15,352 95.1 96.1 100.0 100.0 $19,671 $17,084 86.8 92.1 89.9 79.8 $23,983 $19,668 82.0 89.4 88.9 77.8
70 - 74 $17,122 $16,418 95.9 96.0 100.0 100.0 $20,608 $17,985 87.3 91.3 89.9 79.8 $25,500 $21,169 83.0 87.5 88.9 77.8
75 - 79 $17,234 $16,547 96.0 95.7 100.0 100.0 $20,189 $17,733 87.8 90.5 89.9 79.8 $24,871 $20,339 81.8 86.6 88.9 77.8
80+ $16,440 $16,158 98.3 98.6 100.0 100.0 $19,638 $18,125 92.3 93.9 89.9 79.8 $23,454 $19,689 83.9 88.2 88.9 77.8
Shared Lifetime Earnings 
Quintile
Lowest $10,002 $9,853 98.5 97.4 100.0 100.0 $11,048 $10,775 97.5 96.5 89.9 79.8 $13,512 $13,052 96.6 96.3 88.9 77.8
Second $14,191 $13,810 97.3 96.8 100.0 100.0 $16,227 $15,293 94.2 95.2 89.9 79.8 $19,699 $18,186 92.3 94.4 88.9 77.8
Middle $16,926 $16,316 96.4 96.1 100.0 100.0 $19,796 $17,883 90.3 93.2 89.9 79.8 $24,166 $20,808 86.1 89.6 88.9 77.8
Fourth $19,089 $18,275 95.7 95.7 100.0 100.0 $23,135 $20,110 86.9 88.7 89.9 79.8 $28,925 $23,133 80.0 81.2 88.9 77.8
Highest $21,953 $20,826 94.9 95.4 100.0 100.0 $27,772 $23,324 84.0 84.7 89.9 79.8 $34,787 $26,162 75.2 75.7 88.9 77.8
2030 2050 2070
NCFRR NCFRR Current Law 
Payable 
as a % of  current law scheduled
Current Law 
Feasible
NCFRR Current Law 
Payable 
NCFRR Current Law 
Payable
as a % of  current law scheduled as a % of  current law scheduled
Current Law 
Feasible
NCFRRCurrent Law 
Scheduled
Current Law 
Scheduled
NCFRR NCFRR Current Law 
Scheduled
NCFRR NCFRR Current Law 
Feasible
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: Amounts are in 2010 real dollars. The analysis uses individual rather than family benefits for individuals in married households, unless otherwise indicated, and excludes dependent benefits for 
non-aged spouses. Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). (The index 
used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Tabulations reflect the adult 
Social Security beneficiary population for both current law and the option (i.e., individuals must collect benefits under both current law and the option). 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).  
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Table A4a: Percentage of Adult Beneficiaries with Benefit Changes of Various Sizes under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law in 
2030, 2050, and 2070, No Half Benefit Claiming 
 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
ALL 10.3 72.6 14.9 1.1 0.4 0.8 8.1 25.0 28.4 16.8 13.0 8.8 7.6 18.3 18.7 12.4 12.4 30.5
GENDER
Men 8.7 70.8 17.4 1.3 0.5 1.2 8.8 24.9 25.6 14.1 14.6 12.0 9.0 19.7 17.6 11.0 9.6 33.1
Women 12.4 73.5 12.3 0.8 0.3 0.7 8.4 28.8 30.1 14.5 10.4 7.8 7.4 20.8 20.4 13.0 11.0 27.3
Shared Lifetime 
Earnings Quintile
Lowest 24.2 74.3 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 24.8 38.0 28.3 6.5 1.0 1.4 25.0 33.0 22.9 12.4 3.7 2.9
Second 14.1 82.6 3.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 8.7 43.8 31.5 10.9 3.4 1.6 6.5 33.5 31.9 13.0 7.6 7.5
Middle 8.6 77.5 12.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 3.7 30.9 32.2 16.7 10.7 6.0 1.9 13.6 24.9 17.3 15.3 27.0
Fourth 5.3 70.6 21.2 1.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 17.1 31.4 20.3 17.6 12.2 1.0 3.6 7.3 15.1 22.6 50.4
Highest 1.3 58.3 34.2 3.1 1.0 2.0 1.0 9.2 26.3 19.9 22.4 21.2 0.6 1.9 1.3 3.3 15.4 77.4
2030 20702050
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: The analysis uses individual rather than family benefits for individuals in married households, unless otherwise indicated, and excludes dependent benefits for non-aged spouses. Shared lifetime 
earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average 
Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Tabulations reflect the adult Social Security beneficiary 
population for both current law and the option (i.e., individuals must collect benefits under both current law and the option). 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).  
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Table A4b: Percentage of Adult Beneficiaries with Benefit Changes of Various Sizes under NCFRR’s Proposal and Current Law in 
2030, 2050, and 2070, Assuming Half Benefit Claiming by All Current Law Early Claimants Ineligible for Hardship Exemption  
 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
no 
change or 
higher   
< 5 % 
lower 
5-9.99%  
lower
10-
14.99% 
lower
15-
19.99% 
lower
>=20%  
lower 
ALL 10.2 72.3 15.0 1.3 0.4 0.8 8.1 24.6 28.3 13.7 12.1 13.1 6.7 17.3 16.9 10.3 8.3 40.6
GENDER
Men 8.7 70.5 17.3 1.6 0.5 1.3 7.7 21.9 26.5 15.7 14.0 14.3 7.6 16.8 15.8 9.5 7.3 43.0
Women 12.4 73.1 12.6 0.8 0.3 0.8 7.2 23.4 30.1 16.6 12.3 10.5 6.0 17.7 17.9 11.0 9.1 38.4
Shared Lifetime 
Earnings Quintile
Lowest 22.3 75.7 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 25.4 33.2 30.2 6.0 0.9 4.3 20.9 27.1 15.4 12.2 5.3 19.1
Second 14.4 81.5 3.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 8.9 41.6 32.0 11.0 3.8 2.8 6.5 29.3 28.4 11.8 7.7 16.2
Middle 9.9 75.0 13.3 0.9 0.1 0.7 3.3 26.7 31.4 15.8 13.4 9.4 2.3 15.6 21.4 12.2 10.9 37.6
Fourth 6.4 68.2 21.9 1.6 0.6 1.2 1.1 13.7 26.7 19.1 19.8 19.6 1.0 6.3 10.8 9.6 11.0 61.2
Highest 2.1 59.9 31.0 3.2 0.9 2.8 0.5 5.3 20.4 17.2 24.5 32.1 0.4 3.1 5.2 4.3 6.9 80.3
2030 2050 2070
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: The analysis uses individual rather than family benefits for individuals in married households, unless otherwise indicated, and excludes dependent benefits for non-aged spouses. Shared lifetime 
earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average 
Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Tabulations reflect the adult Social Security beneficiary 
population for both current law and the option (i.e., individuals must collect benefits under both current law and the option). 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).  
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Table A5: Median First-Year Household Replacement Rates in 2030, 2050, and 2070 under Current Law and NCFRR’s Proposal 
(Percent) 
 
scheduled feasible payable scheduled feasible payable scheduled feasible payable
1) 2) 3) 4) 1) 2) 3) 4) 1) 2) 3) 4)
ALL 41.0 41.0 41.0 39.2 43.4 39.0 34.6 38.0 43.0 38.2 33.4 35.9
GENDER
Men 40.7 40.7 40.7 38.5 43.5 39.1 34.7 37.8 42.7 38.0 33.2 35.7
Women 41.4 41.4 41.4 39.6 43.3 39.0 34.6 38.4 43.2 38.4 33.6 36.1
EDUCATION
Not a high school graduate 58.9 58.9 58.9 57.3 60.5 54.4 48.3 59.9 58.8 52.3 45.7 60.5
High school graduate or some college 42.9 42.9 42.9 41.3 44.8 40.3 35.8 41.3 45.7 40.7 35.6 39.6
College graduate or more 34.5 34.5 34.5 31.8 39.2 35.3 31.3 31.1 37.8 33.6 29.4 28.0
Shared Lifetime Earnings Quintile
Lowest 63.4 63.4 63.4 63.4 65.9 59.3 52.6 66.9 70.9 63.0 55.1 67.1
Second 48.7 48.7 48.7 47.8 48.7 43.8 38.8 45.1 49.4 43.9 38.4 45.7
Middle 41.6 41.6 41.6 39.8 44.1 39.7 35.2 39.5 44.4 39.5 34.5 37.2
Fourth 37.2 37.2 37.2 35.0 38.9 35.0 31.0 30.9 39.4 35.1 30.7 29.5
Highest 30.6 30.6 30.6 27.4 33.7 30.3 26.9 23.7 33.0 29.4 25.7 20.0
Current Law Current Law Current Law 
2030 2050 2070
NCFRR NCFRR NCFRR
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of monthly benefits in the first year of benefit receipt divided by AIME. The analysis includes all beneficiaries older than 18, regardless of the type of 
benefit received—retired worker, disability, spousal or survivor. It excludes dependent benefits for non-aged spouses. In the case of married couples, the replacement rate is calculated in the first year in 
which both spouses are collecting benefits. The denominator is the individual’s AIME, or for couples, the sum of their AIMEs. 
 
Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever comes first). (The index used is Social 
Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Tabulations reflect the adult Social 
Security beneficiary population for both current law and the option (i.e., individuals must collect benefits under both current law and the option). 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).  
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Table A6: Projected Median Ratio of Real Lifetime Individual Social Security Benefits to Contributions under NCFRR’s Proposal 
and Current Law, by Birth Cohort, Gender, Education, and Lifetime Earnings Quintile 
 
Scheduled Feasible Payable Scheduled Feasible Payable Scheduled Feasible Payable Scheduled Feasible Payable Scheduled Feasible Payable Scheduled Feasible Payable
ALL 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.06 1.00 1.05 1.12 1.03 0.95 1.02 1.18 1.05 0.95 1.06 1.23 1.07 0.97 1.08
GENDER
Men 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.81 0.85 1.01 0.90 0.81 0.87 1.05 0.92 0.84 0.90
Women 1.52 1.51 1.48 1.49 1.45 1.40 1.35 1.39 1.37 1.30 1.23 1.30 1.36 1.26 1.16 1.27 1.41 1.26 1.14 1.30 1.46 1.27 1.17 1.32
                        
EDUCATION
Not a high school graduate 1.53 1.52 1.50 1.50 1.41 1.38 1.36 1.37 1.33 1.27 1.21 1.30 1.52 1.42 1.33 1.50 1.56 1.41 1.27 1.51 1.63 1.42 1.30 1.54
High school graduate or some college 1.19 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.12 1.14 1.15 1.10 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.08 0.99 1.08 1.22 1.09 0.99 1.12 1.25 1.09 1.00 1.13
College graduate or more 1.09 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.01 0.97 0.99 1.04 0.98 0.92 0.94 1.02 0.94 0.86 0.90 1.10 0.98 0.88 0.94 1.16 1.00 0.92 0.96
SHARED LIFETIME              
EARNINGS QUINTILE
Lowest 1.80 1.77 1.74 1.75 1.74 1.70 1.64 1.71 1.67 1.60 1.51 1.64 1.55 1.43 1.31 1.51 1.61 1.44 1.32 1.58 1.78 1.54 1.42 1.74
Second 1.45 1.42 1.40 1.41 1.40 1.36 1.31 1.36 1.36 1.29 1.22 1.31 1.42 1.31 1.20 1.36 1.44 1.29 1.17 1.36 1.47 1.28 1.17 1.39
Middle 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.19 1.17 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.10 1.04 1.08 1.15 1.06 0.98 1.07 1.21 1.08 0.98 1.11 1.27 1.11 1.01 1.14
Fourth 1.10 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.03 0.98 0.92 0.95 1.04 0.96 0.88 0.92 1.14 1.01 0.91 0.98 1.15 1.00 0.91 0.96
Highest 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.75 0.77 0.93 0.82 0.75 0.76 0.97 0.83 0.77 0.74
Current Law 
NCFRR
1976-1980 Cohort
Current Law 
NCFRR
Current Law 
NCFRR
Current Law 
NCFRR
Current Law 
NCFRR
Current Law 
1951-1955 Cohort 1956-1960 Cohort 1961-1965 Cohort 1966-1970 Cohort 1971-1975 Cohort
NCFRR
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: Amounts are in 2010 real dollars. The analysis uses individual rather than family benefits for individuals in married households, unless otherwise indicated, and excludes dependent benefits for 
non-aged spouses. Shared lifetime earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). (The index 
used is Social Security’s Average Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population.  
 
The real discount rate for accumulation of both contributions and benefits is 2 percent. Individuals who die before receiving Social Security benefits are included in the tabulations if they make payroll 
tax contributions and survive to at least age 30. To reduce the influence of extreme outliers, we cap the tax-benefit ratios at 99. 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).  
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Table A7: Percentage of Adult Beneficiaries with Total Income Less than 25 Percent of the Average Wage Index under NCFRR’s 
Proposal and Current Law in 2030, 2050, and 2070 
 
scheduled feasible payable scheduled feasible payable scheduled feasible payable
1) 2) 3) 4) 1) 2) 3) 4) 1) 2) 3) 4)
ALL 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.3 9.9 11.9 14.2 10.6 10.7 12.9 15.6 11.7
GENDER
Men 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.9 9.3 11.1 13.3 9.9 10.3 12.4 15.0 11.1
Women 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.5 10.4 12.5 15.0 11.2 11.1 13.4 16.2 12.3
        
AGE        
18 - 34 30.6 30.6 30.6 31.2 23.7 29.5 38.2 24.9 35.1 39.5 48.8 36.1
35 - 49 26.5 26.5 26.5 27.9 25.5 30.5 36.9 27.3 27.0 32.6 39.2 29.4
50 - 59 18.6 18.6 18.6 19.6 21.2 25.6 30.0 22.5 20.9 25.6 30.8 22.1
60 - 61 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.4 19.3 23.2 27.3 18.8 20.1 24.6 27.6 21.8
62 - 64 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.4 9.4 11.1 13.0 9.6 6.9 8.3 10.3 7.0
65 - 69 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.7 9.3 11.4 8.3 5.5 6.6 8.3 5.8
70 - 74 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.2 8.5 10.3 12.6 9.5 10.2 12.0 14.8 11.0
75 - 79 6.6 6.6 6.6 7.2 8.9 10.6 12.7 9.7 11.0 13.9 16.9 12.9
80+ 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 10.0 11.8 13.8 10.4 12.2 14.4 17.2 13.4
               
EDUCATION
Not a high school graduate 23.6 23.6 23.6 24.4 25.9 31.1 32.7 26.8 27.5 30.6 34.2 28.9
High school graduate or some college 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.4 10.2 13.6 14.7 10.9 12.9 15.6 19.0 14.2
College graduate or more 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 3.0 4.1 5.0 3.4 4.1 5.5 7.2 4.8
2030 2050 2070
NCFRRNCFRR
Current Law 
NCFRR
Current Law Current Law 
 
 
Source: Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 810). 
 
Notes: The analysis uses individual rather than family benefits for individuals in married households, unless otherwise indicated, and excludes dependent benefits for non-aged spouses. Shared lifetime 
earnings are defined as the average of own (and, if married, spouse’s) indexed earnings from ages 22 through 61 (or year of disability, whichever is first). (The index used is Social Security’s Average 
Wage Index.) Quintiles are defined for the Social Security beneficiary population in the selected year by cohort, not the overall population. Tabulations reflect the adult Social Security beneficiary 
population for both current law and the option (i.e., individuals must collect benefits under both current law and the option). 
 
Payable and feasible projections assume that the reductions occur when the combined OASDI and DI trust funds fall below zero (under the 2010 trustees’ assumptions). Reductions are applied 
identically to OASI and DI beneficiaries based on combined income and cost rates (rather than the income and cost rates for the particular trust fund from which benefits are paid).
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Table A8: Comparison of “Ratio of Averages,” “Average Ratio,” and “Median Ratio” 
for Assessing Adult Social Security Benefits under NCFRR’s Proposal: Calculations 
Using Hypothetical Beneficiaries 
Scenario 1:  Base case
Person
Benefit 
under 
Current 
Law (CL)
Benefit 
under 
NCFRR
$ change in 
benefit 
between CL 
and NCFRR
Ratio of 
NCFRR 
benefit to 
CL 
1 500 550 50 1.10
2 700 720 20 1.03
3 1000 990 -10 0.99
4 1300 1200 -100 0.92
5 1500 1200 -300 0.80
Average 1000 932 -68 0.97
Scenario 2: Better outcome than Scenario 1 for the individual with the lowest 
benefit, worse for the individual with the highest
Person
Benefit 
under CL
Benefit 
under 
NCFRR
$ change in 
benefit 
between CL 
and NCFRR
Ratio of 
NCFRR 
benefit to 
CL 
1 500 600 100 1.20
2 700 720 20 1.03
3 1000 990 -10 0.99
4 1300 1200 -100 0.92
5 1500 1150 -350 0.77
Average 1000 932 -68 0.98
Scenario 3: Better outcome than Scenario 1 for the individual with the highest 
benefit, worse for the individual with the lowest
Person
Benefit 
under CL
Benefit 
under 
NCFRR
$ change in 
benefit 
between CL 
and NCFRR
Ratio of 
NCFRR 
benefit to 
CL 
1 500 500 0 1.00
2 700 720 20 1.03
3 1000 990 -10 0.99
4 1300 1200 -100 0.92
5 1500 1250 -250 0.83
Average 1000 932 -68 0.95
Effects of Proposal Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Median Ratio 0.99 0.99 0.99
Average Ratio 0.97 0.98 0.95
Ratio of Averages 0.93 0.93 0.93  
